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Abstract 
 Bosnia and Herzegovina possesses both a history marked by ethnic 
differences and a tradition of tolerance and coexistence among religious 
groups. The millet system of Ottoman times depended upon the authority 
of confessional communities. With the rise of nationalism in the 1800’s, 
religious identity and organization became complicated by ethnicity. Later, 
the authoritarianism of Tito enabled the state to accommodate this multi-
national, multi-religious character, uniting people as socialist Yugoslavs. Thus, 
the collapse of the socialist, Yugoslavian ideals and structures created new 
and sometimes polarizing choices for the population. Previously authoritarian 
government mediated religious and ethnic relations, but now coexistence 
depended upon elected leaders and a democratic polity. 
 Bosnia and Herzegovina has struggled (indeed fought) through 
the first two decades of its independence. This research contends, however, 
that tolerance and cosmopolitanism can reemerge. The paper focuses upon 
the perception of voters of the Social Democratic Party as an example of a 
secular, new left party, and an alternative to parties which operate based 
upon ethnoreligious identities. The research uses the European Value Study to 
examine popular views of political parties, and assess the issues and interests 
of their members, concluding that changing demographics might dictate a 
further move from ethnoreligious affiliations and toward secular parties. 
Keywords: ethnoreligious, secular, new left, cosmopolitanism, Bosnia 
and Herzegovina
The author is Professor of 
Political Science at Rollins 
College, Winter Park, Florida, 
USA, where she is a member
of the Cornell Distinguished 
Faculty Fellowship. A grant 
from the Cornell Fellowship 
funded this research.
(e-mail: jdavison@rollins.
edu)
1 Šta je važno biračima 
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Bosni i Hercegovini? Liberalno 
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Introduction
 Bosnia and Herzegovina (B&H) possesses a deep tradition of 
tolerance and coexistence among religious groups, but also a history 
marked by ethnic differences. The millet system of Ottoman times fostered 
the authority of religious leaders. With the rise of nationalism in the 1800’s, 
ethnic identity both complicated and reinforced religious affiliation and 
organization. World War II witnessed horrific inter-ethnic violence in the 
region. Later, the authoritarianism of Tito enabled the state to accommodate 
the multi-national, multi-religious character, fundamentally uniting people 
as socialists within the Yugoslavian Federation. Thus, the collapse of the 
socialist, federal, Yugoslav system offered new, and sometimes polarizing, 
choices to the population. As notions of freedom and self- determination 
swept from Eastern Europe into Bosnia and Herzegovina, alternative 
organizing concepts of liberalism and nationalism confronted the people. 
In the past, imperial and authoritarian governments mediated religious 
and ethnic relations, but now tolerance and coexistence depended upon 
democratic leaders and polities.
 Bosnia and Herzegovina has struggled (and even fought) 
through the first two decades of its independence. Many reasons exist 
for pessimism regarding B&H’s future. The current power sharing system 
fails to promote cooperation or good governance so that tensions persist 
among ethnoreligious groups and between elites and citizens. This paper 
contends, however, that B&H’s historic tolerance and cosmopolitanism 
can reemerge and bolster democratization and good governance. First, 
the people accept liberal democracy as a precondition to European Union 
(EU) accession and the economic benefits of membership. Second, group 
differentiated rights, a practice consistent both with the traditional millet 
system and B&H’s current system of power sharing, offers a method to adapt 
liberal democracy to multi-ethnic, multi-religious societies. Finally, this 
research suggests the Social Democratic Party of Bosnia and Herzegovina 
(SDP) serves as a current example of a political party which attracts some 
voters because they associate with its secular and liberal character. 
 Granted, elitism and factional differences sometimes characterize 
the SDP’s leadership. Certainly, Željko Komšić election and re-election 
to the Croatian seat of the tri-partite presidency is controversial. Komšić 
rejects ethno-religious classification and claims to identify as a Bosnian, 
that is, a citizen of B&H without reference to religion or ethnicity. Yet, some 
voters and leaders challenge Komšić’s credibility, disputing his legitimate 
representation of the Croatian people (Sarajlić, 2012). In fact, they assert 
his election highlights an inequity and deficiency in the current system to 
the extent that the Croats, as a constituent people, lack a representative in 
the presidency due to Bosniac cross-over voting for Komšić (Parish 2011; 
Sahadžić 2009). This concern seems warranted given that only 12% of 
Croats feel represented by a party, compared to 42% of Serbs and 31% of 
Bosniacs (Gallup Balkan Monitor, 2012). 
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 Other analysts conclude, however, that many of Komšić’s 
supporters are non-nationalists; this view contends his electoral support 
relates to his ability to appeal to the disenchanted electorate, form a 
multi-ethnic, supra-national coalition, and mobilize independent voters 
(Alic, 2010; The Economist, 2010; National Democratic Institute, 2010). They 
emphasize Komšić’s ability to win 60% of the vote, far ahead of the second 
place challenger who finished with 19% of the vote. They also point to the 
strong showing of the SDP in parliamentary elections.
 This analysis employs results from the European Values Study to 
compare SDP supporters across a number of variables with supporters 
of other parties. The fundamental question is whether the SDP attracts a 
distinctive typae of voter, perhaps a supra-nationalist or multicultural voter, 
rather than an ethnoreligious voter.  Note the purpose is not to argue 
whether Komšić is a legitimate presidential representative of the Croatian 
constituency, or that the SDP leadership is more responsive or accountable 
than other parties.
 Rather, this paper focuses upon the Social Democratic Party as a 
potential practical alternative to ethnoreligious parties, and an alternative 
which some citizens seek. The research examines the character and interests 
of the party’s members, and concludes the SDP offers appealing platforms 
to voters often neglected in identity politics. In fact voters from various 
cultural backgrounds set aside religious considerations for the political, 
economic, and post-materialist policies of the SDP. Additionally, analysis 
suggests that demographics in B&H indicate a possible future movement 
away from ethnoreligious affiliations with generational change. To the 
extent such developments lead to the de-emphasis of political religions 
and romantic nationalisms, an opening might evolve for B&H to embrace 
the cooperation necessary for political and economic progress.
1. Religion, Ethnicity, and Politics
 The fact the origins, character, and durability of religious and ethnic 
identity in B&H is contested complicates discussion of the nature of politics 
and parties. Authors such as Greble (2011) and Donia and Fine (1994) carefully 
describe the organizational authority of early religious communities of the 
region, noting the general weakness of ethnic identities until the surge of 
nationalism beginning in the late 1800s and peaking during WWII. Judt (2005) 
contends Yugoslavia returned to its traditional cosmopolitanism in the post-
war era. Andjelic (2003) argues that in 1990, B&H still lacked the type of ethnic 
movements associated with the modern theories of nationalism. Donia and 
Fine estimate 30% - 40% of the marriages in 1990 in B&H were between 
individuals of different religious groups (1994: 9). Henkel (2009) shows 29% of 
the population considered itself atheist or nonreligious in 1987. Thus, while 
B&H possessed a multi-ethnic, multi-religious character, the political salience 
of these qualities was limited.
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 Moreover, beginning within the environment of self-managed 
socialism of the late 1970’s, various cross-cultural groups developed 
which emphasized shared interests of citizens in industry, health care, 
and tourism (Bartlett, 1985; Uvalić, 1988).  Later in the 1980`s, broad based 
environmental, economic, religious, and academic associations organized 
to voice their particular concerns (Kabala, 1988; Ramet, 1992). Finally in 
the 1990’s, social mass uprisings and movements followed the trend 
throughout the dissolving Soviet bloc, and sought democratization. Civic 
municipal movements invigorated a bottom-up consciousness consistent 
with democratic transition based upon a consensus against dictatorship 
rooted in ‘insight’ and imagination (Wydra, 2007). Their outreach built on 
cosmopolitan civic traditions. The Committee for the Protection of Rights 
and Liberties of Individuals and Groups and the Green Movement included 
citizens irrespective of ethnic identity (Andjelic, 2003). The movements 
attracted a wide range of B&H individuals: Catholic, Orthodox, Muslim, 
Jewish and others. 
 Yet, xenophobic, exclusive nationalisms also emerged in 
response to the system’s collapse and reacted against these movements 
(Crnobrnja, 1996). According to former President of Yugoslavia Dizdarevic 
some communist leaders adopted ethnoreligious identities to counter 
democratization (Tesan, 2007). Authoritarian elites then manipulated 
ethnic and religious histories and tensions to protect their status (Belloni 
and Deane, 2005; Crocker, 2007; Fischer, 2006; Enyedi, 2005). Consequently, 
nationalist parties contested the 1990 elections, and 75% of the vote 
supported their candidates. In late 1991 the Serbian Democratic Party 
(SDS) declared the Serbian Republic of B&H to be followed by the Croatian 
Democratic Union’s (HDZ) declaration of a separate Croatian Community. 
Finally, the war emphasized the critical nature of religious and ethnic 
identities. 
 Debate continues about the specific origin and character of the 
war in B&H. Puhovski identifies this phenomenon of the ‘war after the war…
the battle for the interpretation of the past-as a verbal extension of the war-
the key moment for postwar self-understanding of communities…’ (Novi 
list, 29 May 2004).2 Stokes, Lampe, Rusinow and Mostow (1996) extensively 
review the debate. Woodward (1995) highlights the complex nature of 
the dissolution including the influence of economic and international 
forces. Torsten (2008) examines the changing nature of the conflict as it 
proceeded. Other authors focus upon whether the conflict fits the category 
of war of secession or independence (Krech, 1997; Malcolm, 1996; Sudetic, 
1998). Hoare identifies secession as a consequence of dissolution but also 
describes ‘…Serbia’s assault on Bosnia-Herzegovina [as] the next stage in 
Belgrade’s plan of expansionism’ (2010: 123). Indeed, other analyses focus 
on an interstate war, emphasizing the aggression of one party (Dizdarevic, 
2006; Lampe, 2000; Crnobrnja, 1996). Bennett (1995) specifically highlights 
2  www.ex-upress.com/novi/
novilist29.htlm.
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the behavior of Milosevic. By contrast, other accounts maintain a civil war 
between ethnic groups occurred (Bose 2002, 2007; Burg and Shoup, 1999).
 Facts associated with the B&H conflict establish that the war 
followed independence wars in Slovenia and Croatia. The Yugoslav Army 
transferred quantities of arms and equipment to B&H from Slovenia and 
Croatia prior to the outbreak of fighting. War began in April 1992, lasted 
to autumn of 1995, and became characterized as the most catastrophic 
and painful conflict in Europe since the Second World War (Bieber, 2010; 
Crnobrnja, 1996). As Puhovski (2004) concludes, the conflict possibly 
included elements and periods of aggression and civil war. Furthermore, 
the conflict continued as elites tried to benefit from their political offices, 
and all sides maneuvered to defend their truths.
 B&H now struggles with questions of identity and sovereignty, 
and current efforts from below to reinvigorate cosmopolitanism (Kaldor, 
2006).  Many authors assert the war destroyed the historic strength of civic 
identities (Belloni, 2004; Crocker, 2007; Mujkić and Husley, 2010; Sahadzić 
2009).  Of contending significance is that more than half the population 
desires to move beyond the memories of the war, and the overwhelming 
percentage of the population expresses a willingness to embrace an 
identity as a citizen of B&H (UNDP, 2009). 
 Beyond the ideational impediments of ethnic and religious identity, 
however, stand the structural impediments of the current constitution. 
As a consociational system the structure tends to privilege elected elites, 
emphasize the absence of shared loyalties, and segment the population 
into its relevant identities (Horowitz, 1993; Snyder, 2000). Tsebelis’ work 
(1990) with nested games and veto players explains consociational 
systems as impediments to institutional reform because they reward elites 
who engage in conflictual behavior. Elites avoid compromise because 
they believe their counterparts under pressure will concede, thus giving 
the intransigent elite the best outcome (Ibid). This explanation seems 
consistent with Fischer’s notion of B&H politicians as conflict entrepreneurs 
who perpetuate the system because of the benefits associated with 
patronage (2006). Indeed, Norris (2008) identifies B&H as a case in which 
power-sharing arrangements intensify ethnic extremism and threaten 
democratization. The consociational structure with its tri-partite presidency, 
ethnic vetoes, and powerful entity governments institutionalizes ethnicity 
and often impedes state-building, decision-making, economic rationality, 
and reconciliation (Tsebelis, 1995; Bose, 2002; Norris, 2008). Elected elites 
lack incentives to change the structure which gives them political power. 
In fact, some leaders tend to stir and manipulate ethnic feelings in order 
to maintain their constituencies (Belloni and Deane, 2005; Crocker, 2007; 
Norris, 2008; Tsebelis, 1990). Even voters who prefer a more cooperative 
and effective government, might lack sufficient trust in the system to cast a 
ballot for non-nationalist candidates (Mujkić and Hulsey, 2010).
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 Thus the Dayton Peace Accords reinforce the construction of ethnic 
identities and the validity of political parties based upon separate, unique 
Croatian, Serbian and Bosniac identities. The currently dominant Serbian 
party, Milorad Dodik’s Independent Social Democrats (SNSD) consistently 
pursues a secessionist strategy. The disillusionment of the major Croatian 
party, the Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ), regarding Komšić‘s presidential 
election led it to join the SNSD in demanding a new constitutional 
arrangement with heightened ethnic autonomy.  Indeed, the HDZ and the 
SNSD are ethno-nationalist parties which favor decentralization, cultural 
autonomy, and potential secession. The HDZ formally affiliates as a Christian 
Democratic party, and holds religious and ethnic positions consistent with 
the right wing. The SNSD avowedly shares with the SDP a commitment 
to socialist democracy, however, currently the SNSD’s membership in the 
Socialist International is suspended due to the party’s extreme nationalist 
tendencies. 
 The Bosniac Party of Democratic Action (SDA) prefers to focus on 
the economic issues of its constituents, presenting a detailed economic 
platform with goals for GDP, employment, balance of trade and budgets 
(Avdić and Međedović, 2006). In this sense the SDA potentially shares an 
objective of the SDP, that is, to address salient economic challenges, yet 
while the SDP explicitly appeals for a multi-ethnic approach, the SDA tends 
to accept but deemphasize ethnic considerations. The, SDA highlights its 
economic policy, but maintains its Bosniak ethnic identity coupled with a 
claim of openness to cultural autonomy.
 It is important to note that, despite their electoral success, these 
major nationalist parties and the governments they form do not serve 
as reservoirs of social capital or trust. Rather, people perceive parties as 
invested in corruption and patron-client systems (Divjak and Pugh, 2008: 
375-378). Transparency International’s 2010/11 Global Corruption Barometer 
shows that the public rates parties as the most corrupt institutions in the 
country (with a 4.1/5 where 5 is extremely corrupt).  Furthermore, 59% of 
the public views corruption as worsening, and 70% believe government 
efforts to counter corruption are ineffective. Accordingly, many analysts 
contend that political party leaders win re-election, not based upon 
effective policies, but through the manipulation of nationalist politics 
(Belloni and Deane, 2005; Crocker, 2007; Divjak and Pugh, 2008). Mujkić 
and Hulsey (2010) assert that rational voters continue to re-elect failed 
nationalist politicians, despite their acknowledged disappointment in and 
distrust of these officials, because voters are trapped in a classic prisoners’ 
dilemma. The majority of the electorate from all ethnic backgrounds 
believes the current extreme nationalism of leaders does not serve people 
well (National Democratic Institute, 2010; UNDP, 2009). Mujkić and Hulsey 
(Ibid) explain if all citizens voted for ethnic moderates or non-nationalists 
then B&H’s political stalemate could dissolve. The dilemma for the electorate 
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is that if one ethnic group elects a moderate, while another group elects 
an extremist, then the moderate voters become worse off because the 
extremists will not compromise (Ibid: 144-145). The typical rational voter 
caught in the prisoner’s dilemma casts a vote for a nationalist politician. 
 While such analyses provide a convincing rationale for aspects of 
the current situation, the research also recognizes that a non-nationalist 
outcome is preferred. Mujkić and Hulsey suggest that in an atmosphere 
of trust, rational voters might elect moderates (Ibid: 151-153). A variety of 
opinion polls which highlights public disdain for government and political 
parties supports this view. These polls reveal the popular preference is for 
the leadership to shift its focus from ethnic politics to economic issues 
(National Democratic Institute, 2010; UNDP, 2009).
 Additionally, research on politics and religion highlights that secular 
voters typically prefer secular parties to religious parties, and perceive 
religious parties (as compared to other secular parties) as their primary 
opposition (Breznau et al., 2011). Research also suggests that the decision 
to vote for a religious party often is prompted by perceived corruption 
among secular elites. Yet, in the case of B&H, in which the leaders of parties 
identified with religion perpetuate corruption, it seems voters might turn to 
their secular competition. Indeed, Kurzman and Naqui’s 2010 comparative 
analysis shows that most Muslim voters participating in free, democratic 
elections are not attracted to religious parties. Therefore, electoral space for 
the SDP as a non-religious party to operate seems to exist. At least some 
of the public appears sufficiently dismayed with the current intransigent 
character of politics that they might look beyond identity politics and direct 
their political involvement based upon practical concerns.
2. The Social Democratic Party: New Left
 The Social Democrats explicitly oppose the demands of the 
nationalist parties and continue to press for a multi-ethnic B&H with a 
strong central state. The SDP primarily operates in the Federation of Bosnia 
and Herzegovina (FB&H) where Serbs only constitute approximately 2% 
of the population, but does hold some seats in the Republika Srpska (RS) 
where Bosniacs, Croats and Others probably also constitute less than 2% 
of the population. The SDP’s platform and policies emphasize a multi-
ethnic B&H. The party website calls for solidarity and targets workers and ‘all 
those in need’.  The organization strives to attract followers with appeals to 
counter corruption, and provide accountability and transparency. A critical 
aspect of its character is its strong identification with Europe – it believes 
membership in Europe will facilitate economic and political democracy. 
The SDP also distinguishes itself from its competitors because it favors 
constitutional changes to guarantee the rights of citizens irrespective of 
ethnicity. While parties sometimes deviate from avowed platforms, the 
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SDP’s emphasis on democracy, development and inclusiveness provides 
citizens with an alternative to identity politics.
 After disappointing election results in 2002, the SDP refused to 
compromise with nationalist parties and instead sought to reemphasize 
its focus on the economy, education, and social reconstruction based 
upon B&H’s multi-ethnic tolerance. The SDP now differentiates itself from 
the Bosniac SDA on two substantive grounds. First, the SDP embraces 
strength from diversity and argues for tolerance, while the SDA asserts a 
desire to set aside the national question by providing cultural autonomy 
to all groups. Second, the SDP favors centralization of state activity, while 
the SDA prefers decentralization. In this regard, the SDP distinguishes itself 
from ethnoreligious parties because it favors ending the ethnic preferences 
which exist within the current constitutional system.
 The SDP is a member of the Socialist International and holds 
associate membership with the EU’s European Socialists. Indeed, the SDP 
presents a clear economic platform which seems consistent with its social 
democratic affiliations. The SDP links its identity to its origin in the fight 
against fascism and on behalf of workers in the early 1900s. Typical of 
contemporary European social democrats, the SDP accepts the advantages 
of capitalism and right to private property, but balances these principles 
with a commitment to solidarity and an extended welfare state. The party 
emphasizes the need for government policies which provide all citizens with 
rights to education, health care and employment. It currently highlights 
its commitment to protect the interests of all progressive groups as B&H 
moves out of recession and toward EU accession. It specifically promotes 
social assistance for individuals in need, particularly citizens disabled and 
displaced in the war. 
 Finally, the SDP seems to seek to enlarge its appeal through 
spanning its traditional emphasis on rights to education and health care, 
to a contemporary leftist appeal to inclusion of all groups. Thus, the SDP 
integrates elements of historic social democracy, in its planks for economic 
justice, with post-modern claims for individual liberty and quality of life 
issues. The SDP advocates the equality of all individuals and stands as an 
explicitly anti-nationalist party. 
 Indeed, analysis of the 2008 European Values Study results for Bosnia 
and Herzegovina indicates that the SDP is the only major party with a multi-
ethnic base. Examination of the variables on party preference by religions 
suggests an entirely Muslim following supports the Party for Bosnia and 
Herzegovina (SB&H) and the Party of Democratic Action (SDA). Likewise, 
the Croatian Democratic Union and the Alliance of Independent Social 
Democrats are exclusively Roman Catholic and Orthodox, respectively. By 
contrast, the supporters (that is the population which claims it would vote 
for the party) of the SDP are 67% Muslim, 27% Catholic, and 5% Orthodox. 
Given that the SDP primarily operates in the Federation and not the 
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Republika Srpska, the ethnic diversity of support mirrors well the diversity 
of the population. Although no official post-war census has occurred, the 
UNHCR’s 1996 census estimates an approximate breakdown of 46% Bosniac, 
37% Serb, and 15% Croat. Within the FB&H estimates are 73% Bosniac, 22% 
Croat, 2% Serb and 2% other. When individuals in the European Values Study 
are asked which party appeals to you most, 100% of HDZ supporters are 
Croats, 100% of SNSD supports are Orthodox, and 100% of SDA supporters 
are Muslim. By contrast, 70% of the SDP base is Muslim, 18% is Catholic 
and 12% is Orthodox. Thus, the SDP attracts wide support relative to (and 
consistent with) the demographics of the FB&H. 
 With regard to other demographic variables, the SDP appears in 
some instances to resemble the HDZ and SNSD, but clearly is markedly 
different than the SDA; that is, the SDP and SDA seem to appeal to different 
Muslim constituencies. Most notable is the breakdown of age of supporters 
for the SDP and SDA. Older Muslims seem far more inclined to support the 
SDA. Only 13% of SDP voters are older than 46, while 41% of SDA voters are 
older than 46. Conversely, only 32% of SDA supporters are under the age 
of 30, while 63% of SDP voters are under the age of 30 (Table 1). Possibly 
older voters feel and remember the ethnic cleansing during the war, while 
young voters 18-30 are less inclined to be influenced by a war which began 
20 years ago.  If an accurate interpretation, then SDP supporters possibly 
vote in a rational, long term prospective time frame different than the SDA’s 
retrospective time frame. This also might suggest that as generational 
change proceeds, parties like the SDP might draw increasing strength.
Table 1.  Age Distribution of Supporters (Percentage)
SDP SDA HDZ SNSD
18-30 63.33 31.82 66.67 57.14
31-46 23.33 27.77 22.22 25.71
47-62 6.67 36.36 5.56 17.14
> 62 6.67 4.55 5.56 0.00
Source: European Values Study, B&H
 Additionally, and partially as an effect of the age distribution of 
supporters, the SDP’s voters tend to be better educated than the SDA’s 
electorate, and more comparable to the voters of the HDZ and SNSD. 
Eighty percent of SDP voters have high school or university educations, 
while only 56% of SDA’s voters possess such a background (Table 2). The 
SDP’s positioning as a party of tolerance, focused upon a future in Europe, 
might attract better educated, younger voters who perceive their economic 
status, civil liberties and political freedom best secured through the EU.
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Table 2. Educational Level of Supporters (Percentage) 
SDP SDA HDZ SNSD
Primary (or none) 20.00 43.50 18.80 19.88
Secondary 62.00 55.29 62.32 68.29
University 18.00 1.18 18.84 12.80
Source: Ibid
 Analysis of other variables by party within the European Values 
Study suggests the SDP tends to attract a base with a higher annual income 
than the SDA or SNSD attracts. The HDZ’s supporters have the highest 
income, but this probably relates to a generally more developed economy 
in Herzegovina from which it draws its electorate.  Most noticeable is that 
69% of SDA supporters have annual incomes below 3.600 euros, while 
only 32% of SDP supporters possess incomes at this low level. Forty-eight 
percent of SDP voters are employed, while only 30% of SDA voters hold jobs. 
Moreover, the appeal of the SDP starkly contrasts with the SDA in higher 
income categories where the SDA draws negligible support. The SDP splits 
the base of the wealthiest segment of the population, earners above 18.000 
euros annually, with the HDZ.  These statistics suggest the broad nature of 
the SDP’s socio-economic attraction. The party’s appeals for solidarity and 
commitment to individuals with great need coupled with its focus on the 
economy and membership in Europe enable it to attract supporters from 
across the socio-economic spectrum. Additionally, the SDP’s ability to gain 
votes from Muslims and Catholics who wish to move beyond ethnic politics 
probably explains the party’s appeal to individuals with a broader range of 
income given that Catholics tend to be the highest earning and Muslims 
the lowest earning segments of the population. 
3. A Deeper Examination of the SDP’s Appeal
 Given that the SDP appeals to diverse economic and ethnic 
groups in B&H, the challenge then is to identify why the party attracts 
such support. The first avenue of explanation is that SDP supporters are 
more tolerant of diversity and/or less religious, and therefore more likely 
to favor a secular party than are supporters of other B&H parties. Indeed, 
as a proxy measure, responses to questions on the European Values Study 
show 39% of SDP voters claim inter-religious marriage is not a problem. 
This contrasts with 14% of SDA voters, 16% of HDZ voters and 30% of 
SNSD voters.  Additionally, SDP voters are far less likely than other voters 
to believe religion should influence politicians. Approximately 21% of the 
SDP’s electorate concurs, while 51% disagrees. In marked contrast, 56% of 
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the SDA’s electorate believes religion should matter for politicians, and only 
19% disagrees. Thus, it seems more secular Muslims would be more inclined 
to support the SDP than the SDA. Consistent with this is the fact that 54% 
of SDA supporters report regularly attending religious services while only 
13% of SDP supporters regularly attend. Finally, 55% of HDZ supporters 
view religious beliefs as important for politicians while 28% disagree, 
and 75% report regular service attendance. Again, it might be the case 
that more tolerant and/or secular Croats tend to consider supporting the 
SDP (Table 3). Indeed, SDP voters comprise 57% of all voters who disagree 
with the notion that religion should influence politicians. The comparable 
percentage for the SDA is 12%, and for the HDZ is 20%. Likewise, SDP’s 
electorate constitutes only 12% of the total electorate that agrees that 
politicians should permit religion and beliefs to influence  decision-making.
Table 3. Religiosity and Parties’ Electorate (Percentage)
Politicians rely upon God SDP SDA HDZ SNSD
Agree Strongly 3.06 10.84 10.14 18.13
Agree 18.37 45.78 43.48 23.75
Neither 27.55 24.10 17.39 27.50
Disagree 32.65 18.07 21.74 22.50
Disagree Strongly 18.37 1.20 7.25 8.13
Source: Ibid
 Percentages for the SDA, HDZ and SNSD are 28%, 22%, and 32% 
respectively, with the remainder supporting smaller B&H parties. These 
results indicate that SDP supporters perhaps are attracted to the party 
because of its explicitly non-denominational and secular character.
 In this regard, it is important to note that Muslims in B&H seem to 
be less precise about their Muslim identity than Muslims in other states. 
Perhaps this suggests a relative de-emphasis of the identity and/or lower 
level of religiosity which might dampen the compulsion to vote for a party 
identified with religion, particularly the further in time B&H moves from 
the defining events of 1992-1995. A majority of Muslims in B&H identify as 
‘just Muslim’ with the remainder identifying as Sunni. This is comparable 
to the response in Kosova and Albania, but differentiates the population 
from Muslims in other countries, particularly in the Middle East, South Asia, 
and Sub-Saharan Africa (Pew, 2012: 128). Likewise only 30% of B&H Muslims 
attend the mosque at least weekly, while more than 60% attend seldom 
or never. This compares to weekly attendance rates of about 60-80% 
throughout the Middle East, South Asia, and Sub-Saharan Africa. In these 
regions, the non-attendance rate tends to range from 30%-45% (Ibid: 130). 
{ 16 } What Matters to Social Democratic Party Voters?
 In fact, only 36% of B&H Muslims agree that their religion is important 
to them. Of 39 Muslim populations surveyed, only three countries have a 
lower percentage agreeing their religion is important: Albania, Kazakhstan 
and Uzbekistan (Ibid: 8). This weaker affiliation with Islam as well as the high 
level of infrequent mosque attendance, then potentially suggests a lower 
likelihood that they will vote only Muslim. An important consideration 
is that Muslims who rarely attend mosque are unlikely to hear politics 
interpreted from an Islamic perspective; nor will they benefit from the 
shared consciousness of the frequent attendees. The organizational basis 
often associated with membership in religiously affiliated parties therefore 
is absent (Olson, 2011).
 Another source of attraction of the SDP for Bosniac and Croatian 
voters seems to be its identity as a contemporary party of the New Left. 
Twenty percent of voters who self-classify as left contend they will vote 
for the SDP, while only 12% intend to vote for the SDA and 2% plan to 
vote for the HDZ. The SNSD also attracts 20% of the left vote, but it is less 
apparent that the SDP competes for voters with the SNSD particularly in 
the RS. Furthermore, a much smaller percentage of the SDP’s membership 
classifies itself as ideologically right when compared to the memberships 
of the SDA, HDZ and SNSD. The results of the European Value Study shows 
only 25% of the SDP considers itself as right wing while approximately 46% 
of the SDA, 74% of the HDZ and 50% of the SNSD claim to be right wing 
(Table 4). The data suggests that the HDZ is considered a right wing party 
based upon its nationalist identity. The SNSD is less clearly right wing; while 
it formally claims to be socialist, its nationalist politics pulls it to the right 
in a one-dimensional ideological spectrum. Perhaps the SDA’s identity is 
most interesting given the claim of the HDZ leadership that the SDP simply 
serves as another vehicle for Bosniac voters. Not only is the SDP’s Muslim 
and Croatian electorate noticeably more secular than the SDA’s supporters, 
but the SDA members tend to perceive themselves on the center-right 
while the SDP supports tend to shift toward the center- left.
Table 4. Ideological Identification among Party Electorates
Party Left Center Right
SDP 32.89% 42.11% 25.00%
SDA 23.08% 30.77% 46.15%
HDZ 5.66% 20.75% 73.58%
SNSD 17.86% 32.14% 50.00%
Source: Ibid
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 Yet, the identification of the SDP as center-left compared to other 
B&H parties exists with some ambiguity. When B&H party supporters are 
asked to respond to specific policies associated with a left-right spectrum 
in the country, the distinctiveness of the SDP as the party of the left is 
lost. For example, in response to a question whether industry should be 
government owned or privately owned (scaled with 10 as government and 
1 as private ownership) the mean responses for party supporters were: SDP 
6.3, SNSD 7.2, SDA 6.7, SBiH 5.3 and HDZ 5.2. When people are asked whether 
meeting economic and social needs falls primarily to the state (10) or 
individuals (1), responses ranged among the various parties from 6 to 7 with 
SDP members averaging 6.47. When party supporters were asked whether 
emphasis should exist on equal incomes (10) or individual incentives (1), 
the SDP, SDA and HDZ all had means of approximately 5. Such results 
suggest two tentative conclusions: first that society still is transitioning in a 
post-communist era, and the population is caught between capitalist and 
socialist paradigms, and second, the characterization of the SDA and HDZ 
as center-right compared to the center-left SDP might rely heavily upon 
the supporters’ association of nationalist and religious appeals with the 
right wing. When the SDA and HDZ are considered solely on an economic 
spectrum, these parties’ appeals appear comparable to that of the SDP. 
 Consequently, the perception of the SDP as center-left could arise 
precisely because it has disassociated from any ethnoreligious appeal. The 
SDP won 5 of 42 parliamentary seats in 2006 and 7 of 42 seats in 2010. 
Additionally, Komšić as the SDP presidential candidate won the Croatian 
seat in both elections. Although the party suffers from factionalism and 
elitism common in B&H, it seems to attract a base which is less defined 
by ethnoreligious identity than the base of the other dominant parties. 
The SDP probably does attract “new left” voters who emphasize issues of 
accountability, governability and quality of life rather than nationality. Such 
citizens  risk supporting a non-nationalist party which favors structural 
changes to decrease the influence of ethnicity in government and eliminate 
the counterproductive incentives of power sharing.
Conclusions
 The deadlock which surrounded B&H politics since the 2010 
elections began to thaw in late 2011. The anticipated independence for 
Republika Srpska and possibly Herzegovina failed to materialize. At the end 
of the year, a new government formed with six major parties cooperating 
to share power in order to position B&H for EU and IMF assistance. Yet, 
uncompromising, ethnoreligious politics based on exclusive identities 
continues to loom as a potential quagmire for B&H. The SDP stands as an 
alternative for rational voters frustrated with the prisoner’s dilemma of 
ethnoreligious politics. 
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 Indeed, B&H’s history suggests the possibility of alternative 
cultural traditions beyond the current polarization and segmentation of 
ethnoreligious groups. Howard discusses civic cooperation and contends 
that ‘organized groups committing violence…hardened ethnic identities’ 
(2012: 167). Olson (2011) examines the important cultural effect of religion 
on politics, and the tendency to dichotomize identities, but also mentions 
the potential for shared values among religious traditions. Greble (2011) 
details the long history of multiculturalism. Thus, the SDP might serve as a 
vehicle to begin to reclaim B&H’s multi-religious, tolerant culture.
 Moreover, the effect of communism on culture should be 
considered. As noted, the SDP, as well as all B&H’s current major parties, 
tends to favor a mixed economy with a safety net. The B&H citizen operates 
within a post-communist context. Inglehart and Welzel demonstrate 
that post-communist polities tend to be less religious than comparable 
societies outside the former communist experience. Breznau et al. (2011) 
also suggest that voters in post-Communist systems are more likely to 
support non-religious parties than voters in other states. While the conflict 
in B&H creates unique complications, the SDP offers a choice for citizens 
frustrated with ethnoreligious politics. The party positions itself as a party of 
the center-left, and it could expand its membership as generational change 
occurs and younger secular and less religious voters increase in proportion. 
The option is one which emphasizes the relevance of the new center-left in 
transitioning states for citizens who seek inclusion, accountability, a social 
safety net, and individual rights (Cronin et al., 2011: 3). In B&H, society still 
must negotiate the precise type of balance between capitalism and socialist 
democracy which elsewhere in Europe already exists and evolves, but the 
SDP alone emphasizes the salience of such issues beyond the question of 
ethnicity.
 The SDP represents both the left of the 1900`s with representation 
from workers and veterans, but also the intellectual, post-material quality 
of life and libertarian left of the new century. The party’s commitment to 
structural and constitutional changes to support high quality democracy 
separates it from the ethnoreligious parties which favor the current 
consociational system. Howard suggests that structures must change in 
B&H for the political system to break from ‘the ethnocracy trap’ (2012: 155). 
The SDP currently challenges  the status quo of power-sharing among elites 
and promotes structures for reform. As such, the SDP offers an alternative 
to identity politics and an opportunity for individual and national freedom 
and progress within B&H.
{ 19 } Joan Davison
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